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TRANSCENDENCE AND THE CATEGORICAL 
IMPERATIVE 
by David Stewart 
In chapter two of his "Transcendental Doctrine of Method," Kant observes 
that all the interests of reason combine in three questions: 1) What can I know? 
2 )  What ought I to do? and 3) What may I hope?' With characteristic modesty 
Kant asserts that he has exhausted all possible answers to the first question. 
The second question is purely practical, and although it comes within the scope 
of pure reason, it is not transcendental but moral, and thus demanded Kant's 
second Critique. But the third question is more of a problem; there is no work 
expressly labeled a "critique" which treats the question of hope, although it 
enters into Kant's moral phiIosophy and his discussion of the categorical 
imperative. It is possible, however, to consider Religion Within the Limits of 
Reasoil Alorle as Kant's third "critique"; it is a critique of religion in the sense 
that Kant judges religion by the parameters of morality and identifies religious 
hope with hope for moral p e r f e c t i ~ n . ~  Two things emerge from considering 
Religion Within the Limits ofReason Alone as a third Kantian critique. First 
is the close identification of religion with hope which, in the second Critique, 
is made expllcit by Kant's treatment of the postulates of morality. Second is 
the fact that the question, "What may I hope?" is engendered by the question, 
"What ought 1 to do?"; Kant is plain on this point. 
The third question-If 1 do what I ought to do, what may I then hope?--is at once practical 
and theoretical, 111 such a Fashion that the practical serves only as a clue and when this IS 
followed out, to the speculative question For all hop~ng is d~rected to happiness, and stands 
in the same relation to the practical and the law of morality as X N O W I N ~  arid rile lawof narure 
to the theoretrcal knowledge of things .' 
This admission is singularly informative, for here Kant ties together the law 
of morality and hope, while at the same time paralleling them with the law 
of nature and knowledge examlned in the first Critique. For there to be 
knowledge in Kant's sense-that is, knowledge which is both universal and 
necessary-the intuitions of experience must be categorized and schematized. 
The road from bare intuitions through the categories and the schematism, with 
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detours through the transcendental unity of apperception and a passing glance 
at the transcendental object, at last reaches the level of judgments. 
In the process from intuitions to judgments the role of the categories is 
central, for without the categories there would be no judgments. The schema- 
tism, to be sure, is important, but mainly in showing how the categories are 
applied to intuitions. But the categories are applicable only within experience 
and not beyond the realm of sense experience. Nothing is clearer in Kant 
than the impossibility of transcendental employment of the categories to 
totalities beyond the bounds of sense. If the elaborate Transcendental Deduc- 
tion makes anything clear, it is that the categories have only empirical 
e m p l ~ y m e n t . ~  
When Kant turns from pure theoretical reason to pure practical reason, he 
searches for a basis for the lawfulness of the categorical imperative. Given 
Kant's love for architectonic, one is not surprised to find Kant presenting a 
table of categories for practical reason corresponding to the categories of 
quantity, quality, relation, and modality deduced in the Critique of Pure Rea- 
sotz. But the role these "categories" play in Kant's practical philosophy seems 
minimal, and there are good grounds for Beck's assessment of them as "some- 
what artificial and arbitrary, without the completeness and elegance and neces- 
sity claimed for the categories of theoretical r e a ~ o n . " ~  More important for 
Kant's ethical philosophy are the postulates of practical reason, which 
he characterizes as demands made by reason. The significance of this, 
I am convinced, has not been given due attention, for it provides a key 
to understanding what Kant's connection between religion and morality 
really implies. 
THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE 
Any consideration of Kant's moral philosophy must begin with the categor- 
ical imperative and its source, the good will. The good will, and the good will 
alone, Kant reminds us, is the only thing that is good without q~al i f ica t ion.~ 
From the good will stems an unconditioned demand that one ought to do one's 
duty. This demand is unconditioned by any prudential concern; hence it is 
categorical. Come hell or high water, I ought to do my duty; reason, in its 
autonomy and self-legislative employment, demands this of every reasonable 
being. The categorical imperative can be stated formally: act only on that 
maxim that can be willed a universal law of nature; treat humanity either in 
your own person or that of others always as an end and never as a means; and 
act only on that maxim which is autonomously self-legislated. This is familiar 
ground, and it represents the heart of Kant's moral theory. There is more to 
come. 
TRANSCENDENCE AND THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE 89 
A necessary condition for moral law, as Kant reminds us in the preface to 
his second Critique, is the concept of freedom, the reality of which is an 
apodictic law of practical reasons7 But how does Kant "prove" freedom? One 
will look in vain for a deductive or logical proof; such is not Kant's style. 
Indeed, in the Critique oJPure Reason the categories were not proved deduc- 
tively or logically but transcendentally; that is, the categories were shown to 
be necessary conditions for knowledge. The style of Kant's proof is quidjuris, 
the "proof' is the proof of the law court. Similarly, in the Critique of Practical 
Reason Kant calls morality before the court of reason and demands a proof 
of the necessity of freedom. And if Kant is not the judge, st  least he is the 
inquisitor extracting the preconditions for moral judgments in the same way 
he discovered the preconditions for theoretical judgments in his first Critique. 
The "I ought" tmplies "I can"; else morality would be a fleeting chimera not 
grounded in universal law. If we are to make sense out of any moral imperative, 
whether hypothetical or categorical, apodictic o r  relative, we must accept 
freedom as a necessary condition. Freedom is thus "proved" by Kant as a 
postulate essential to the exercise of the imperatives of a moral If the 
specter of the first Critique was Humean skepticism, the bogeyman of the 
second Critique was ethical determinism. 
But the postulate of freedom calls for a second and a third. Freedom is not 
only the keystone of the moral law but provides "stability and objective real- 
ity" to the additional postulates of practical reason-God and i rnm~rtal i ty .~ 
The latter two concepts are not themselves conditions of the moral law but are 
"the conditions of applying the morally determined will to the object which 
is given to it apriori (the highest good).'"' What is significant here is that the 
intention of the will-die Absicht aufs hochste Gut-is not given to practical 
reason but demanded by it; the .highest good is a Verlangen, a demand for 
totality which results from the necessary connection (Zusammenhang) be- 
tween morality and happiness." 
As a teacher of Kant's works, I frequently find students making a wrong 
turn here. The phrase "highest good" seems to summon up the notion of God. 
But Kant is not referring to God as the highest good, although the students' 
mistake is a natural one. A good medieval (and Cartesian) definition of God 
is the unity of all transcendental perfections; God is not only highest in the 
order of goodness but also in beauty, truth, and being. Particularly if echoes 
of idealism are still resounding in their heads, students seem to reason in this 
fashion: Kant says that reason in its practical employment demands totality, 
the highest good. The highest good is God; therefore, the source and ground 
of the moral imperative is God. God is not only the erzs realissimum but also 
the ens peifectissimum and the ens bonissimum. Therefore, the moral law 
within, like the starry heavens above, declares not only the glory but the reality 
of God as well. 
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Thls kind of argument has its attractions, to which I will return later, but 
the argument is not Kantian. The highest good is not God but is what we can 
best describe as a state of affairs-a situation in which morality and happiness 
are conjoined. Reason demands that the picture of the righteous suffering and 
the wicked prospering is intolerable-not only morally intolerable but ratio- 
nally intolerable, The virtuous man ought to be the happy man; the wicked 
man should suffer the results of his moraI perversity. Alas, the world is not 
like this: the necessary connection between morality and happiness is not 
realized in this world. Although the idea of a moral world has objective reality, 
not as an intelligible intuition (Kant says we are unable to think any such 
world), its objectivity is that of an object of pure practical reason. Such a world 
Kant describes as a corpus rnysticutn of free and rational beings under the 
moral law in which every such being would act in complete conformity with 
the moral law and in unity with the freedom of every other person. Such a 
world would be possible, Kant says, only if some Supreme Reason is posited 
as the underlying nature and cause of thls necessary connection between the 
demand of the moral law and the hope for happiness. It is this demand 
of practical reason for totality that leads Kant at the conclusion of the 
Critique of Pure Reason to postulate God and a future life as inseparable from 
the sense of duty imposed by the moral law. God is required to bring about 
the sumtnutn botrurn as well as a future life in which such a state of affairs 
can arise. 
Thus wlthout a God and wrthout a world lnvrsrble to us now but hoped for, the glorrous 
tdeas of mordhty are rndeed objects of approval and admrrat~on, but not sprrngs of purpose 
and action For they do riot fulfil in its completeness that end whlch is natural to every 
ratlorial betng and whrch IS determined apnorr, and rendered necessary, by that same pure 
reason l Z  
It at first appears contradictory that Kant would reinstate God and a future 
life as "postulates" of practical reason when he had previously ruled them out 
in his critique of the transcendental illusion. The transcendental illusion results 
from the attempt to extend our knowledge beyond the phenomenal to the 
noumenal order, to apply the categories of the understanding in a realm that 
is beyond the bounds of sense. How, then, can Kant appeal to God and a future 
existence for the human personality when he had so strenuously ruled out such 
considerations in his first Critique? One answer to this questlon is provided by 
Paul Ricoeur, who suggests that for Kant the transcendental illusion was only 
possible because there is a legitimate thought of the unconditioned; and one 
will fail to understand Kant's postulation of freedom, God, and a future life 
unless he sees them as subtle reinstatements of the transcendent objects which 
the Critique of Pure Reason denounced as illusory. Ricoeur interprets the 
postulates of practical reason as expressing the 
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mln~mal cxi5tentlal ~rnpllcat~on f a practical aim, of an Absrchf, wh~ch cannot be converted 
into ~ntellectual ntultlon The 'extens10n'-Erwerrerut~g-the 'access~on'-Zu,vac/~s-they 
express is not an extensron of knowledge and awareness but a 'd~sclosure,' an Eroffirung 
(Crrrrqlre of Pracrtcal Reasot~, p 140); t h ~ s  'd~sclosure' IS the philosoph~c equivalent of 
hope IJ 
HOPE A N D  TRANSCENDENCE 
One cruciaI difference in Kant's treatment of God, freedom, and immortal- 
ity as postulates of practical reason and his critique of them in the transcenden- 
tal illusion centers on their role for practical reason vis-a-vis the theoretical use 
of reason. The transcendental illusion results from the attempt to apply the 
categories transcendentalIy, and Kant's critique of this shows that any effort 
to extend knowledge to include such totalities is doomed to failure. This is the 
reason for Kant's insistence that the ideas of practical reason give no extension 
or enlargement to theoretical reason; the postulates themselves are merely 
immanent and constitutive and are the grounds for the possibility of realizing 
the necessary object of pure practical reason, i.e., the highest good.14 But if 
the possible object of practical reason is not given in intuition, how can it be 
thought? What may be needed is a new "category," a true category of practical 
reason. Such a "category" seems to be implicit in the dialectic of practical 
reason itself, for hope-or to use Kant's term, expectation (Erwartung)- 
fulfills this role. Hope, like the categories of quantity, quality, relation, and 
modality, is a pure concept of reason given prior to any experience, for hope 
defines the structures of consciousness in relation to the ideas of practical 
reason and the highest good as the object and final aim of practical reason. The 
object of hope, however, is not given in intuition; the highest good is demanded 
by practical reason in its search for totalization. 
Kant had already seen the close identification of hope and religion. This 
identification is not merely arbitrary, for its necessity is seen even more clearly 
when hope is raised to the level of a category of practical reason in its demand 
for totality. This also signals a "Copernican Revolution" in Kant's moral 
religion: religion is not just a projection of human aspirations into the divine, 
as Feuerbach thought, nor does religion result from man's thwarted quest for 
happiness. It is rather a necessary addition to morality so that the demands 
of practical reason can be "springs of action and purpose." Seen under the 
category of hope, religion is an essential end of practical reason; subsumed 
under the category of expectation, the postulates of practical reason are neces- 
sary conditions for the achievement of the possible object of the will's moral 
intention. 
HOPE AND MORALITY 
The importance of hope for Kantian moral theory is clearly seen in its 
relation to the moral imperative. Reason indeed can, in its autonomy, legislate 
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the moral action, but it is incapable of bringing about the highest good. Only 
a Supreme Reason can effect the summum bonum. Though noble and a cause 
for wonder, the moral imperative is incomplete; without hope it cannot provide 
"springs of action and purpose." Only the highest good demanded as an 
intention of the good will can guarantee the applicability of the moral impera- 
tive in its categorical purity, So in answer to the question, "What may I hope? 
Kant would answer: "You may hope for the ultimate unification of virtue and 
happiness; reason demands this. But if not in this life, surely in the life to come. 
The necessary presupposition for this hope is the Supreme Reason, and though 
reason in its theoretical employment cannot present such a totality to itself, 
reason in its practical employment provides grounds for this conviction." One 
could say, although not in Kantian language, that the categorical imperative, 
in order to be applicabIe to human endeavors, is complete only when it is 
grounded in a transcendent reality. The idea of God, which was ruled out by 
the transcendental illusion and had only limited application as a regulative 
idea, is now seen to be the ground of moral action. 
Would Kant have agreed with Ivan Karamazov's claim that without God 
everything would be permitted? Clearly Kant would not have wanted to agree 
with this, for the good will, in its legislative autonomy, would dictate the moral 
choice even if there were no God. But for such maxims to become actions, 
Kant seems to imply that the intention of the will, the aim for the highest good, 
is required. Just as the categories had to be schematized in order to  apply to 
intuitions, so the moral imperative must be related to human actions by means 
of hope for the highest good. And the highest good is only thinkable on the 
supposition of the existence of a Supreme Reason who can bring about such 
a state of affairs. 
Kant's appeal to God in a kind of postscript to his moral theory is at first 
troubling. Troubling not only because the stern denunciation of the Transcen- 
dental Illusion looms as large as ever, but troubling too because the premises 
upon which Kant builds his basis for belief in God have led others to opposite 
conclusions. Consider the bare outlines of Kant's argument: If I am to take 
morality seriously, reason demands that virtue and happiness ought to be 
conjoined. Nothing, however, is more obvious than the fact that they are not 
conjoined in this life. But they must be conjoined; reason demands it. There- 
fore, there will be a future life in which this conjunction takes place. A 
necessary condition for hope in such a future life is God. Therefore, God exists. 
Put in this fashion the argument seems to lead inexorably to God, but one gets 
the impression from reading Kant that the rational grounds for belief in God 
were merely a transcendent prop for his ethical views. This question aside, the 
real problem is discovering whether Kant's argument carries the burden he 
thought it did. 
Even a cursory reading of the philosophers of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries makes clear that the most obvious ground for atheism is moral 
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outrage. From Ivan Karamazov's insistence that he could not belleve in a God 
who allowed innocent children to suffer, to Albert Camus's railings against the 
absurdity of a world which refuses to conform to human, moral demands, the 
rejection of God's existence on moral grounds has played counterpoint to the 
other concerns of contemporary philosophers. The argument starts from Kant- 
ian premises: the superabundance of evil in the world makes clear that the 
world is not the sutnmum bonum, and reason denounces the hiatus between 
morality and happiness as absurd. A loving God, possessed with the omnipo- 
tence ascribed to him by believers, would not tolerate such a world. Since such 
a world is too plainly with us, God does not exist. All these objections were 
plainly stated in Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, and there is 
no reason to suppose that Kant was unfamiliar with them. Yet Kant does not 
respond to such objections directly, although he does so indirectly in his 
analysis of moral evil in his "Essay on Radical Evil." 
From the Kantian viewpoint, it is startling to see the atheist, armed with 
his consciousness of moral law, declaring that the moral perversity in the world 
implies the nonexistence of God. But the reasoning is straightforward: the 
world does not conform to  reason's demands; therefore the world is absurd. 
The world does not conform to reason's specific demands of what it would be 
if there existed a beneficent God; therefore God does not exist. In contrast, 
Kant's assertion is: the world does not conform to  reason's demands; therefore 
God exists and will guarantee a future life in which reason's demands will be 
fulfilled. This is not a dictate of reason in its theoretical employment; it is 
rather a demand of practical reason as a necessary condition that must be 
acknowledged if we are to take moral imperatives seriously as springs of action 
and purpose. 
I think we can add to this Kantian rejoinder by returning to some of the 
implications of the second Critique. If man were merely a phenomenal crea- 
ture bound by the inexorable constraints of causal necessity, a chance by- 
product of an impersonal cosmos, then the moral question would not have 
arisen. The first question, What may I know? would be the final question. But 
the moral question is raised, and it is raised by reason. The implications of the 
categorical demands of morality are startling in their power to revise Kant's 
view of man offered in the first Critique. The categorical imperative calls forth 
the postulates of freedom, God, and a future life, with the correspondtng 
alterations requiring that man be seen as more than a phenomenal being. 
Reason in its practical employment forces us to see man as a noumenai self, 
free to  obey the dictates of reason in its self-legislative autonomy as ~t wills 
categorically the moral imperative. I would hasten to add, for this is the real 
point of my argument, that all this is grounded, for Kant, in the transcendent 
reality of God. Kant's moral "proof' of the existence of God is not a mere 
addition to his ethical theory, as might first appear, but is an integral aspect 
of his ethical views. "The idea of the highest good," Kant says, 
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inseparably bound up wlth the purely moral dlspositlon, cannot be reallzed by man htmself 
. yet he discovers wlthin himself the duty to work for thls end. Hence he finds himself 
impelled to believe In the cooperation of management of a moral Ruler of the world, by 
means of which alone thls goal can be reached I 5  
Kant inseparably unites the idea of God with the moral imperative, but he 
does so by means of the concept of the summum bonum. Why does he not 
take the more direct step of grounding the moral consciousness of man in the 
transcendence of God? Part of the problem Kant faced was that of reconciling 
the self-legislated autonomy of the categorical imperative with the specter of 
a heteronomous morality legislated by God. In other words, could man freely 
choose the good if this choice were grounded in God as the source of moral 
values? Because this problem loomed in the background, Kant preferred to 
relate God to the categorical imperative only indirectly, as the guarantor of 
the summum bonum. Perhaps an additional consideration was the false identi- 
fication of supposed duties with the "will of God." Too many wars have been 
fought in God's name for such an easy identification to be admitted; and 
Kant's own fierce criticisms of clericalism and false religion provide ample 
caveats for the unwary. In contrast, Kant proposed to test all religious duties 
by the moral criterion; we can judge all religious dogmas by such a standard, 
accepting those that pass and discarding those that fail. 
The closest Kant ever comes to grounding the categorical imperative di- 
rectly in the transcendent reality of God is to declare i t  a mystery; i t  is 
mysterious because of reason's inability to comprehend how man can be free 
yet simultaneously submitted to a divinely grounded moral law. Yet he seems 
to recognize the appeal of such a view. 
We can conceive of the universal uncorrdrr~orred subjection of man to the divine legislation 
only so far as we llkewtse regard ourselves as God's creatures; just as God can be regarded 
as the ultimate source of all natural laws only because He IS the creator of natural objects 
. So the legislation whlch IS dlvlne and holy, and therefore concerns free be~ngs only, 
cannot through the tnstght of our reason be reconciled w ~ t h  the concept of the creatlori of 
such belngs, rather must one regard them even now as exlstlng free be~ngs who are deter- 
mined not through thetr dependence upon nature by virtue of their creatlori but through 
a purely moral necesgitatlon possible according to the lawc of freedom, 1 e ,  a call to 
citizenship III a divlne state Thus the call to thls end is morally qutte clear, whlle for 
speculation the posciblllty of such a calling is an Impenetrable mystery 
Neither noumenal freedom nor hope for a future life was comprehensible by 
speculative reason; both are postulated by, demanded by, reason in its practical 
employment. Similarly, practical reason demands that happiness and virtue 
ought to coincide. How are we to understand such a demand? Is finite, human 
reason its source? Or is such a realization grounded in the transcendent reality 
of God? 
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It tvould appear that Kant explicitly avoids such a conclusion because of the 
difficulty in reconciling reason's autonomy and freedom with God as the 
source of moral law. But one can appeal here to Ricoeur's interpretation of 
the postulates of practicaI reason as openings to another dimens~on of human 
experience. T o  use Jaspers's term, one could say that the moral law is a cipher 
of transcendence, an indication of a transcendent ground to moral experience. 
But this dimension is closed to speculative reason and can be approached only 
as mystery. T o  some, the picture of the icy logician of Konigsberg moving 
toward mystery will be offensive. Perhaps they will conclude that all this is 
merely a remnant of Kant's pietistic upbringing, although such a response is 
psychologistic in the extreme. Perhaps it is less offensive to  see Kant's being 
led by the logic of his moral theory to  a position which he only reluctantly 
accepts. Yet it seems more plausible to me to believe that Kant was recognizing 
that the human moral consciousness points to a dimension of experience which 
can be approached only as mystery. Such an interpretation is shared by Jas- 
pers, who observes: "Kant assumes that there is, a t  the confines of reason, a 
realm of the unfathomable and mysterious. But the unfathomable is not the 
irrational; rather, it is something which reason experiences as the limit of 
reason. . . ."I7 
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